Project Overview

There has been a great deal written about the political conflict in Northern Ireland between 1968 and 1998, commonly known as the “Troubles”. A large number of insights have been provided by this work regarding this conflict in particular and conflict as well as violence in general; indeed, there are very few conflagrations in world history that have been studied as much (e.g., see the Conflict Archive on the Internet [CAIN] reading list\(^1\)). Despite this attention there is still a large number of issues that have not been dealt with and are thus not understood very well.

In line with the new micro-foundational their within studies. The Northern Ireland Research Initiative (hereafter NIRI) was created in 2008 to address the current lack of: 1) disaggregated, 2) systematically collected, 3) publicly available data on the Northern Ireland conflict, 4) across source and type of violation. Project information can be found at the URL in the footnote.\(^2\) Some projects exist which address some of these issues but none address all of the relevant factors just identified. This has not only hindered our ability to understand what has happened during the conflict through a detailed accounting of who did what to whom, but it also hindered our ability to assess important theoretical explanations for what took place, such as explorations of the importance of political, economic, cultural and social factors commonly believed to influence “Trouble” related conflictual activity.

To address this problem, NRI has engaged in an ambitious research effort composed of numerous elements:

1) Unique, comprehensive and publicly available data collection of events with information about perpetrators and victims at different levels of analysis (i.e., street, neighborhood, city, region and country);
2) Multi-level theorization and examination about the determinants and processes of political conflict/violence; and,
3) Filmed testimonials whose raw footage will be used for research, a documentary film as well as an interactive video installation on the web and

\(^1\) [http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/discrimination/read.htm](http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/discrimination/read.htm).

one that will be portable (hyperlinked to maps and the database mentioned above).

Below, we will discuss the difficulties with existing research and then put forward the specific approach adopted by the NIRI project.

**Problems with Research on Conflict/Violence**

If we examine the literature on the Troubles, most studies employ qualitative analysis of the causes and resolutions for political violence. Such studies draw their data from interviews and qualitative interpretations of historical texts and government documents. By engaging a multitude of sources, and examining the complexities that can only be presented using qualitative data, such studies have provided dramatic improvements in our understandings of why the Troubles occurred (e.g. McGarry and O’Leary 1998), why individuals participated in the Troubles (e.g. White 1989; Bell 1997), why violence occurred during different phases (e.g. Gerachty 2000; Darby 1986) and why the peace process ultimately succeeded (e.g. Darby and MacGinty, 2000; McGarry and O’Leary 2004). But there has been little transparency with regards to how data was collected for such studies. As a result, it is impossible to identify systematic biases in the data collection process. For example, interviewing only individuals following a particular persuasion or disregarding strands in the historiography could lead to bias towards a particular political perspective, towards an urban interpretation, or in favor of more recent revisionist interpretations.

In addition to the work identified above, there have also been a series of studies designed to explicitly catalog the violence that took place during the Troubles. For example, the intensity of media exposure and the open access granted to academics by the governments of the United Kingdom and Ireland has allowed scholars to produce compendiums detailing all deaths that occurred throughout the Troubles (e.g. Sutton, 2001) or particular regions (e.g. Ardoyne Commemoration Project 2002). The most well known is Sutton’s Index of Deaths from the Troubles, produced as part of the CAIN data collection project. Within this data, information for each individual killed is provided regarding the name of the victim, who was responsible for their death, the location and time of the events in questions and a general description of the incident. These data have proven useful in generating a wide variety of studies, ranging from a study of the causes of ethnonationalist violence (Maney 2005) to a study estimating the cost of terrorism on stock prices (Frey et al. 2007)

While it is true that there is no small amount of information available about the Troubles, there are some limitations with the information compiled. Current data collection efforts tend to focus almost exclusively on the number of people killed as well as the circumstances surrounding those deaths (e.g. McKittrick et al 1999). While tragic – approximately 4,000 people were killed as a result of the Troubles – this focus has tended to disregard the large number of people who were stopped at road blocks, had their homes searched, who were tortured, beaten or were victims of other forms of political

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3 http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/sutton/index.html
discrimination. Indeed, overlooking low-level violence and daily experiences of political
discrimination has prevented us from understanding the full magnitude of what was
experienced at the time – i.e., the daily lives of those who survived what took place.
Instead we have a birds eye view of the conflict, highlighting the most dramatic and most
commonly known events.

A limited number of scholars have begun to examine other forms of conflict/violence,
such as punishment or sectarian attacks on symbolic targets (e.g. Jarman 2004; LaFree et
al. 2009), but this effort has been limited to the analysis of annual level changes across
the entire province of Northern Ireland. Using annual statistics released by Northern
Ireland’s police force, such studies are able to increase our understanding of violence
committed during the Troubles, but because of the high degree of aggregation involved in
such work, only macro-level independent variables have been considered as causes of the
onset, dynamics or reduction of relevant behavior. Further, such projects have been
limited to the analysis of a single form of violence, such as terrorism or retaliatory
attacks. Progress in the collection of Troubles-related data would require significantly
more disaggregation across both time and space, as well as the ability to systematically
gather data across a multitude of forms of violence.

In addition to these scholarly sources collected, a number of human rights organizations
have collected data on particular abuses (e.g. torture in prisons). Although useful, this
work has been focused on particular human rights campaigns and has not been systematic
over time. Moreover, this work has been collected and held privately which while
essential for protecting the victims of violence, the lack of publicly available data on the
details of these violations makes it difficult to analyze the information along with other
demographic information.

In sum, although prior efforts at compiling all relevant information about the Troubles
has been useful, this research suffers from four problems: 1) it is too aggregated, 2) it is
not always systematic in its collection, 3) it is frequently not available to the public and
4) it does not consider a diverse array of actors or actions across diverse sources. NIRI
seeks to change this.

Why disaggregate?

While many forms of political violence take place within nation-states (e.g., protest,
repression, insurgency, civil war and genocide), it is clear that most often the entire
nation-state is not involved. Indeed, recent research has been very clear about the fact
that sub-national variation in conflict is quite significant (e.g. Kalyvas 2006; Cederman et
al. 2009). Examining these differences is important for several reasons: 1) this gives us
better information about what is being done and where, 2) this gives us better traction on
identifying causes for conflict/violence as the explanations are likely tied to sub-national
factors and 3) this allows more precise interventions as diverse actors attempt to pre-empt
conflict/violence, stop on-going conflagrations or direct aid/assistance to those in need
afterwards. These issues are clearly relevant in the Northern Ireland case. For example,
in Northern Ireland the patterns of violence varied between urban and rural locations
In Belfast and Derry/Londonderry, terrorist attacks, urban riots, and police raids characterized the violence. In South Armagh, the South Armagh Brigade of the PIRA fought a more conventional civil war against the British Army. Here, violence was characterized by police “stop-and-search” roadblocks and larger, more conventional attacks by the PIRA against the British Army.

Existing scholarship has done well in identifying causes of political conflict/violence at the national level (e.g., Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Hegre and Sambanis 2006). Comparatively, efforts to explore sub-national variation are just beginning (see review in Kalyvas 2008). Evaluating the predictions derived from the cross-national literature sub-nationally provides further tests of the validity of existing theories. Cross-national studies have been plagued by problems ranging from selecting the dependent variable and an overreliance on a small number of paradigmatic cases to the prejudices imposed by basing comparisons on unlike units (Kalyvas 2008; Davenport 2007; Snyder 1978). Sub-national analyses can help to mitigate many of these problems both by increasing the number of treated and untreated units as well as by ensuring that the units being analyzed are sufficiently comparable. Moreover, moving from national to sub-national comparisons presents an opportunity to more directly measure the effects of the presumed causal mechanisms at work (Snyder 2001).

Although there are numerous positives, sub-national analysis is especially difficult because the data requirements are somewhat daunting. It is one thing to identify and track institutions, behaviors, and attitudes at some aggregated-national level, even of a contentious nature. Both international and national organizations compile and widely distribute such information. It is quite another to identify and track institutions, behaviors, and attitudes at some sub-national level, especially of a contentious nature. With this level of specificity, individuals and organizations can directly be held accountable for what they have and have not done. Given the heinous nature of some of the activities of interest to scholars of conflict and violence, this raises a large number of questions as well as difficulties. Nationally aggregated data are comparatively much less sensitive.

The effort to identify sub-national activity has also been hampered by a tendency to highlight national level (i.e., macro-level) factors instead of meso-level (i.e., group oriented) or micro-level (i.e., individual oriented) factors. Some work has been directed toward the latter two areas but again this work is relatively new and suffers from a variety of limitations (e.g., Kalyvas 2006; Straus 2004, Wood 2000). By privileging national level explanations, existing work has missed important linkages between the various levels that contribute to the application of political conflict/violence. For example, we do not know how local level political conflict/violence escalates to produce aggregate categories such as civil war. We do not know how national level interactions between elites shape the decisions local-level civilians make about participation in political violence. We do not know how specific security force institutions engage in repressive action nor how the activities they engage in vary across time and/or space. Disaggregation assists us with all these issues.
Why systematic collection?

Understanding and clarity about what has taken place requires both methodological as well as theoretical advances. Specifically, we raise four issues.

First, we note that the majority of analyses of political conflict/violence have relied upon information that was compiled in a non-systematic manner. Those in the quantitative community forget this but most examinations are historical or anecdotal in nature but these have not always been as clear with conceptual definitions, operationalization/measurement or comparability. Systematic collection allows us to assure transparency, consistency, reliability and comparability.

Second, an explanation for the limited degree of understanding regarding political conflict/violence concerns the fact that the data on political activity necessary to conduct an examination of macro, meso and micro factors simultaneously has not yet been brought together in a single study. Existing work has examined the effects of national level changes on aggregate levels of violence (e.g. Lacina 2006), or how changing battlefield dynamics affect localized instances of violence (e.g. Davenport and Stam 2009), but the study of political conflict/violence has yet to integrated all levels into one database. Work has even begun to test national level theories at the local level (e.g. Buhaug and Rod 2006), but this work has yet to connect the national level variables to the local level dynamics already shown to influence the application of violence (e.g. Kalyvas and Kocher 2009).

Third, research relevant to the topic has focused on specific categories of conflict/violence (such as deaths or riots) and static conceptions of national level characteristics (such as ethno-linguistic fractionalization). As a result, the connection between different forms of conflict/violence and multiple levels of analysis has been missed. Pushing the study of political conflict/violence forward means integrating the macro, meso and micro factors in such a way as to generate a coherent theory capable of predicting when conflict/violence occurs, the many forms it can take, and how it may be prevented.

Fourth, while newer literature takes issue with the over aggregation of data employed by most researchers up to the present, the level at which these studies collect data have often been dictated by data collection requirements, rather than a priori theoretical justifications. For example, scholars seeking to disaggregate the study of political conflict/violence frequently rely on found data and convenience samples⁴ (e.g., Straus 2006). Where they have collected their own data such efforts frequently proceed after the conflict has concluded (e.g. Kalyvas 2006). As a result the temporal and geographic specifications of the units of analysis are often fixed by the origins of the data (e.g., governmental agencies) or by the ability of individuals to recollect significant events long

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⁴ Convenience sampling is a type of nonprobability sampling in which the sample is drawn from a part of the population which is close at hand or convenient to reach. A sample collected in this way may not be representative of the population therefore making generalizability difficult.
after they pass which has consistently been identified as problematic given recall bias (e.g., conducting interviews after relevant activities have ended).

Improving our understanding of conflict/violence and addressing the issues raised above requires systematically collecting data across the different levels identified, which can then be used to evaluate complex theories linking macro, meso and micro level variables. By collecting data at different units of analysis, without preference to any subtype of conflict/violence or level of spatial-temporal aggregation, NIRI will allow for the generation and testing of theories detailing the interaction of complex processes operating to produce political violence. For example, with this database we will be able to explore the influence of national-level policies on the activities of security forces in the field as well as the influence of local-level mobilization (e.g., terrorism or protest) on both security force level behavior and national level policies. We can use the database to evaluate the interaction between national elections, electoral outcomes measured at the district level, and street level acts of violence. Additionally, we can use the database to evaluate the effects of institutional oversight on political violence. Related to this topic, we have collected data on national changes in the standard operating procedures directing the military, local level military capacities, and household level data on military behavior during raids. It is only by combining the different data collection efforts that constitute NIRI that it will be possible to develop and analyze theories that cut across existing divides in the study of political conflict/violence.

**Why publicly available?**

Part of the explanation for the limited understanding of conflict/violence in general and in Northern Ireland in particular is that much of the relevant information needed for proper examination has not been distributed to the public in a way that they can understand what was compiled and conduct their own analyses. Indeed, either such information is contained in forms that do not facilitate direct analysis (e.g., lists on webpages and pre-packaged graphs or tables that cannot be modified) or they are not easily accessible (e.g., they sit in Kew library in an unseen/sorted pile of documents). The stated mission of NIRI and the broader project from which it emerged (the Radical Information Project) is to provide the information about conflict/violence to the widest possible audience. There are multiple reasons for this: 1) the more eyes on the problem, the higher the likelihood that insights could be provided, 2) if social science is to progress, the research process must be as transparent as possible, and 3) it is possible that we have done something incorrect and only through data sharing would someone be able to discover this and assist us in improving the database further.

**Why compile information across source and type of conflict/violence?**

Most of the existing data collected on Northern Ireland in particular and most conflict databases in general relies on a single type of action and frequently from an individual source. These choices make sense but they raise specific problems. For example, the study of political conflict/violence has been overwhelmingly concerned with the deaths resulting from interactions between armed actors ([e.g. Condra et al. 2010; Lyall 2010])
and more recently between armed actors and civilians [e.g. Lyall 2009; Kalyvas 2006; Balcells 2010]), or with other categorical forms of violence such as riots (Varsney 2003; Wilkinson 2006; Tolnay and Beck 1995; Horowitz 2003). By focusing their study on the explanation of a single category of conflict/violence, however, this research has left out all other forms and in the process ignored the fact that lethal violence is often an outgrowth of other forms of conflict. Deadly acts emerge as non-deadly violence escalates, and riots both kill and emerge in response to fatal incidents that occurred previously. Additionally, some forms of conflict/violence are substituted with others in an effort to reduce loss of life but to continue the struggle at hand. Both of these issues (escalation and substitution) are missed with a limited conception of the range of possible actions (i.e., the repertoire).

Similarly problematic are studies that exclusively examine violence perpetrated by one actor without reference to the other participants in the conflict (e.g. Mitchel 2009; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Weinstein 2006). Finally, choosing to examine the causes of violence produced by a single source is problematic for a number of reasons. Perhaps the most primary is the wealth of information available suggesting that violence emerges as part of the strategic interaction between states and insurgents, as well as between competing non-state groups (Davenport et al. 2005; Cunningham et al. 2009; Stanilan 2010). But an additional concern relates to the contention that similar forms of violence, even if they are produced by competing sources of violence, may be generated through similar causal mechanisms (e.g. Tilly 2005). By choosing to focus solely on one actor, such studies miss the opportunity to test theories of one source of political violence across other competing sources.

**Contributions of The Northern Ireland Research Initiative**

To resolve the limitations identified above, The Northern Ireland Research Initiative (NIRI) has engaged in a series of data collection projects designed to capture the patterns of conflict/violence that took place at multiple levels during the Troubles. Using numerous, partially overlapping data sources, the goal of these efforts is to identify and catalogue all events from all actors that took place in Northern Ireland from 1968 to 1998. The result will be an unrivaled events database that can then be used to develop and test theories of why conflict/violence occurs, why states repress, why dissidents protest, how governments and challengers interact with each other as well as how violence was ultimately replaced by non-violent claims making.

NIRI presents major advances in the collection of data on political violence across a number of dimensions.

First, the project collects data on non-deadly acts of violence as well as fatal incidents. Where the study of political conflict/violence has traditionally given priority to a single type of violence, and chosen to ignore the others, NIRI collects information on the entire spectrum of political conflict ranging from what might be labeled the most mundane to the most severe (e.g. from road blocks to arrests to home raids to political marches to mural paintings to massacres). By collecting data on all forms of conflict, NIRI is better
able to capture the processes linking one form of violence to the emergence of other acts of conflict later.

Second, the dataset will move away from the traditional conflict variables, and record a series of important factors yet to be considered by conflict research that ranges from the micro (such as the connections between individual events as well as perpetrators) to the macro (such as the changing patterns of counter-insurgent strategy as well as residential segregation). To explain these diverse forms of conflict and the ways in which they relate to one another, NIRI is collecting data on a range of independent variables that extend far beyond those so far analyzed by conflict scholars. As noted above the study of political conflict/violence has recently made the transition from macro-level studies to more micro-level analysis. While this move constitutes progress in the field, the process of transition meant that the micro-level studies carried with them a lot of theoretical and empirical “baggage” from the macro-level analysis. Accordingly, many micro-level studies have been designed to replicate the findings from macro-level studies to see if these variables still bear causal weight in more fine-grained analyses (e.g. Buhau and Lujala 2005; Lujala et al. 2006; Raleigh and Hegre 2009). In addition to being able to check the robustness of these results against another conflict and with additional controls, NIRI presents the opportunity to analyze the effects of a range of new independent variables in the study of political conflict/violence. Some significant examples include relevant links between victims, the reciprocity ties between feuding groups, and the involvement of specific agents of the state’s security apparatus.

Third, the data are compiled from multiple sources. Generating all of the data discussed above can only be done through the dissection and coding of different sources. Four are particularly noteworthy: 1) records from human rights NGOs, 2) interviews with survivors (as well as later perpetrators), 3) files generated by the military and police, and 4) media reports. Scholars creating micro-level data on political violence have traditionally relied on one of these sources, and ignored the others. Most often, this has meant looking at news reports (e.g., Earl et al. 2003; White and White 1996), but in other studies it has involved the analysis of government documents (e.g., Kalyvas and Kocher 2009) or survival records (e.g., Kalyvas 2006). Problems of selection bias plague each source, leading to empirical challenges to studies relying on one in particular. For example, media coverage tends to over report large incidents, and incidents near urban centers (Davenport and Ball 2002; Ortiz et al. 2005); media reports and government documents are predisposed to the government’s position (Davenport 2009); and survivors tend to be subject to memory lapses and trauma (Pham et al. 2004). By using different sources to generate different reports of what happened, and comparing the different versions against one another to generate estimates of event counts in accordance with the best practices in the field (e.g., Ball 2010), NIRI presents a more accurate and less biased version of conflict/violence than most databases in conflict studies.

Given these objectives, NIRI has made great advances by collecting data from a number of media outlets as well as “raw data” from interviews, human rights reports and

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5 Much like the transition from COW studies of international war and the macro-level civil war studies (see Blattman 2009 for a review)
government documents. To complement the information available from media sources, NIRI is working with local partners to conduct interviews with survivors of violence committed by all parties in the conflict. Last summer 58 interviews were compiled from individuals such as this and several hundred more are planned.\(^6\) In addition to this, the project has gathered thousands of reports of human rights abuses committed by Northern Ireland as well as British governments and catalogued by a local human rights organization. These were scanned and coded by NIRI personnel. Finally, government documents are used to record violence committed by non-state actors, as well as the movements of the police and military. The non-state, non-media sources of information employed complement the newspaper data by presenting greater coverage of rural incidents, capturing a greater number of smaller incidents, and capturing alternative perspectives on the different incidents of violence. Meanwhile, the data from the state’s bureaucracies compliment the media coverage by providing greater detail on the under-reported incidents, such as attempted bombings that were prevented or raids by police that constituted much of the every day violence too often taken for granted by the media.

Below, we will discuss the sources compiled by NIRI and several other related tasks. We will then discuss what we plan to do with the compiled materials.

\textit{Data Collected}

NIRI has already collected information from the following sources (the years of the conflict covered by the source is provided in the parentheses following the source):

2. Fr. Faul, Fr. Murray and Sister Sarah Clark’s archives, housed at the Tomas O’Fiaich Library, St. Patrick’s Cathedral (1970-1990s)
5. Deutsch and Magowan (1968 to 1974)

All of this material was coded where we identified information about the victim (e.g. name, age, organizational affiliation), event (e.g. type of violation, surrounding events and security situation, severity of the violation, weapon used), perpetrator (e.g. name, organizational affiliation, reason for targeting victim) as well as geographic information (where possible). The codebook is attached to this document as an appendix as well as a chart of all sources. Each source will be discussed below.

\(^6\) Specifically, we will interview 900 families/individuals who suffered losses during the Troubles: i.e., 300 protestant/loyalists, 300 republican/catholics and 300 british military families. We have not yet been able to get access to RUC families. We will also interview individuals that either did not lose anyone (i.e., they had family members injured) or they did not experience any direct form of violence/discrimination.
1) **ALJ Statements**

The Association of Legal Justice (ALJ) was a human rights organization formed in 1970 to catalogue the abuses suffered by residents of Northern Ireland during the armed conflict. ALJ disbanded in the early 1990s. The organization primarily focused on charging and sentencing patterns in the Northern Ireland justice system at the time. During their history, ALJ collected over 4,000 statements of abuse from victims or those who witnessed the violations. These statements were collected with a wide range of detail (see Appendix) and identified both violent as well as non-violent events during the conflict, particularly in regards to police and state abuse.

NIRI’s collection of statements were compiled from both the personal collection of Clara O’Reilly, one of the founding members of ALJ, as well as the Father Murray Collection in the Tomas O’Fiaich Library at Saint Patrick’s Cathedral, Armagh, Northern Ireland.

**Fr. Faul, Fr. Murray and Sister Clark Archives**

In January 2009, NIRI sent a team of 4 researchers to Armagh, Northern Ireland to index and archive the writings of Father Raymond Murray, Father Denis Faul and Sister Sarah Clark. These three collections are housed at the Tomas O’Fiaich Library at Saint Patrick’s Cathedral, Armagh.

Fr. Murray’s archive details his work as the prison chaplain for Armagh Prison in the 1970s (when it served as a women’s prison) and following this when he remained posted there through Internment (as it became an overflow facility for male and female prisoners from Belfast and surrounding areas were transferred to Armagh). Fr. Murray formally documented complaints, abuse and torture throughout the Troubles. In addition to his personal notes on various abuses, including prison torture and the degrading sexual abuse of women prisoners, Fr. Murray collected many of the personal statements taken by the Associate for Legal Justice. This work was indexed and digitized as part of our ALJ statement collection.

Fr. Murray also worked with a fellow priest, Fr. Denis Faul to document patterns of abuse throughout Northern Ireland. Fr. Murray and Fr. Faul published a series of pamphlets and reports on systematic abuses during the Troubles. This research included victim and witness statements as well as historic information collected by the priests across time. Digital copies of these pamphlets were collected for NIRI.

In addition to the joint work of Fr. Murray and Fr. Faul, pieces of Fr. Faul’s personal writings were also indexed and digitized. The majority of Fr. Faul’s writing are at the National Library in Dublin, Ireland, however, much of his personal collection that was still in his possession at the time of his death is being housed in Armagh. Of this collection, works pertaining to the Troubles, including arrest lists and abuse statements were indexed and digitized by NIRI.
Finally, the works of Sister Sarah Clark were also included in this data collection effort. Unlike Frs. Murray and Faul, Sr. Clark worked primarily with Republican prisoners in Britain. Her personal collection mostly contains the personal correspondence between her and the families of prisoners. Where this information was relevant, it was digitized and included with the other NIRI records.

*Ardoyne: The Untold Truth*

The Ardoyne Commemoration Project published a book in 2002 entitled “Ardoyne: The Untold Truth”. This is a published book which details the deaths of the 99 people killed in the Ardoyne area of Belfast from 1969 through 1998. The book is based on over 300 interviews including victim’s family and friends as well as other community members. The information in the book was collected by a local organization from within the Ardoyne community.

*Lost Lives*

This book is a comprehensive list of individuals killed by political violence during the Troubles. For each individual, there is a detailed description of how they died, who killed them, the types of evidence used to make claims regarding perpetrator responsibility, as well as numerous personal details about the life of that individual and what s/he might have been doing immediately before their death. Also recorded are individual characteristics, including age, gender, occupation, religious sect and address. The source was compiled by a team of Northern Ireland’s most well known journalists, including David McKittrick. To generate the individual narratives, the journalists surveyed press reports, coroner’s reports, official inquests, and conducted interviews with members of the paramilitary groups and security forces. This is commonly believed to be the most detailed and well-respected source for reporting deaths on the Troubles.

*Deutsch and Magowan*

This source is a three-volume event catalogue coding major violent and political events in Northern Ireland from 1968 through 1973. This event catalogue was compiled from Northern Ireland newspapers. Contained within the document are the records for political activities including protests, strikes and civil rights marches as well as violent contention such as bombngs, shootings and army attacks. The Deutsch and Magowan collection also includes non-contentious activities such as political speeches and elections.

*The British National Archives (BNA)*

The BNA contain documents internal to the British Government, including the bureaucratic logs and records of the British Army’s operations in Northern Ireland. NIRI has systematically collected complete sets of three different types of documents from the Archives. The first of these are security briefs, which document perceptions of security and insecurity at the cabinet level. Tracking these provides a sense of how the
government perceived progress during the period. The second are “Situation Reports” or SitReps. These documents were the formal paperwork to be filled out in situations where members of the army encountered, or interacted with opposition movements, including both paramilitary groups and non-violent marches. The SitReps record specific details about the missions in which they encountered the opposition movement, including who was patrolling and what they were doing in that particular place and time. Finally, NIRI collected data on military activity in military log files. These are local level registers of every action engaged in by an individual Battalion, and record all activities conducted by members of that unit by the date and location. These records provide the most comprehensive listing of British activity in the province.

Public Records Office of Northern Ireland (PRONI)

The PRONI is the branch of the British archival system responsible for cataloging documents from the various branches of the cabinet operating in Northern Ireland as well as various bureaucratic agencies that have functioned in country. From PRONI, NIRI has collected documents from two sources – Cabinet 9B, and the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC). Cabinet 9B was the cabinet committee responsible for governing Northern Ireland during the period of direct rule (1972-1998), and handled matters related to security. These documents record estimations of security throughout the six-counties, as well as record annual statistics on various indicators of political stability, such as killings, bombings or arrests. The RUC was Northern Ireland’s police force during the Troubles. RUC documents collected by NIRI the patterns of police behavior during the Troubles, and include weekly summaries of RUC activities, such as patrols, raids, and arrests, in the principal conflict areas.

Existing NIRI Projects

In addition to data collection, NIRI has completed several other tasks as well.

First, we have created both a searchable violation archive based on the Association of Legal Justice witness statements (approximately 4,000). This archive was created for the exclusive use of Relatives for Justice, the organizations created following the disbanding of ALJ. With this information, one could search for the witness statements based on a persons name, date of incident or location of event.

Second, in collaboration with Relatives for Justice and the production team of Brian Ashby & Ben Kolak, NIRI recorded 58 video interviews with families and individuals about their experience of the conflict in Northern Ireland from 1968-1998. The exercise was a pilot project for a larger-scale project mixing social science research, documentary film, and new multimedia technologies, led by Professor Christian Davenport of University of Notre Dame. The filming discussed above was conducted between July and August 2010. Most of these interviews took place in and around Belfast, though several took place in rural regions of Counties Tyrone, Derry, and Down. The majority of the interview subjects came from Irish Nationalist or Republican family backgrounds, and were bereaved or injured by the British Army or Loyalists paramilitaries, often in
incidents reportedly involving collusion by the British Government to conduct or cover up the attacks. The interviews ranged in length from 25 minutes to 2 hours 15 minutes, with the average length about 1 hour. Interview participants were asked three questions: (1) What was life like before the Troubles, (2) What was life like during the Troubles (the majority of the subjects had either been seriously injured or lost an immediate family member on account of the conflict) and (3) what was life like after the Troubles?

A photographic exhibition is provided on the following URL and one video is provided on a second webpage for viewing by Troubles Consortium personnel exclusively. Contact Prof. Davenport for the password to view the edited film.

Where do we go from here?

At present, the data collected are ideal for exploring several questions that emerge out of the literatures on political conflict/violence more generally and on the Troubles specifically. Here we present just a few:

1) How does violence escalate from lower non-fatal incidents to the taking of human life? Similarly, what factors can lead to the de-escalation of violent tactics?

2) How are retaliatory cycles of violence set into motion, and how may they be contained?

3) What are the implications of the fragmentation of one armed group on the violent activities put forward by other groups?

4) Do non-deadly acts of violence have the same causes as deadly acts of violence? And are they perpetrated by the same types of actors?

5) Do acts of violence produced by low level functionaries of the state have similar causes as acts of violence ordered by central commanders?

6) How do shifting chains of command within rebel organizations or the security forces affect how they respond to violence produced by the other side?

7) How do changing patterns of ethnic composition affect the deployment of political violence?

8) What forms of political violence are most likely to spark civil protest?

9) When do violent actions lead to institutional change, and what are the effects of such change on subsequent acts of violence?

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http://web.me.com/christiandavenport/Site_81/NIRI_Film_Stills.html
10) What are the methodological implications of the contention that violent events are not independent and identically distributed (IID) as is commonly assumed in statistical analyses, but rather a set of interrelated events?

We will investigate these issues individually and/or in tandem with the Troubles consortium (a group of researchers who are affiliated with NIRI in order to systematically examine collected data as well as develop new areas of research based upon the compiled material). The Consortium includes a wide variety of individuals: Christian Davenport - Kroc Institute - University of Notre Dame (Convener), David Armstrong - University of Wisconsin, Kathleen Cavanaugh - University of Ulster, David Cunningham - Brandeis University, Scott Gates - Peace Research Institute of Oslo, Pete Hatemi - University of Iowa, Cyanne Loyle - University of Maryland/Kroc Institute, Rose McDermott - Brown University, Will Moore - Florida State University, Brendan O'Leary - University of Pennsylvania, Jillian Schwedler - University of Massachusetts, Allan Stam - University of Michigan and Christopher Sullivan – University of Notre Dame.

As conceived, NIRI is not finished. Indeed, we are only getting started. We are currently cleaning and merging the existing data. Specifically, we are bringing together our coding of Lost Lives, the ALJ statements, Deutsch and Magowan, the Ardoyne Commemoration Project and the Sutton Index of Deaths into a single database. We are also working to code the tens of thousands of military and police records collected from the BNA and PRONI. These records will later be merged into the same database.

Other large data collection projects are planned as well. The most notable of these involves systematically collecting and coding events recorded in the British, Irish and International press, which we will obtain digitally and code in line with the extraction program called Tabari. Newsapers present daily listings of the most significant events occurring during the Troubles. Coding the information contained in these records presents the opportunity to access events that were missed by the other sources identified by NIRI as well as examine another perspective on events already identified. Of course, we are well aware that newspaper coverage, as noted above comes with a number of biases. One method for mitigating some of these biases involves examining multiple newspapers from a variety of different political persuasions and geographic locations (see Davenport 2010). Towards this end, NIRI intends to collect the records of a diverse set of newspapers, including partisan newspapers put out by parties in the conflict (such as the An Phoblacht), Northern Irish newspapers (such as the Belfast Telegraph), British papers (such as the Daily Mail) and international papers (such as the New York Times). These will be explored individually as well as in tandem.

In addition to work on existing data archives, we intend to complete the collection of victim and family testimonies through the film archive begun in 2010. NIRI will begin with granting access to the Consortium and later will grant access to those approved by the Consortium and RFJ. Later still, NIRI will expand the existing archive of 58 families/testimonials to include a collection of victims, perpetrators and political

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8 http://web.ku.edu/~keds/software.dir/tabari.html
notables. As the filming continues, the archival material will be put into a searchable, web-based archive which will merge the interviews with the existing data in the NIRI archive. A prototype for this idea has been placed on the following webpage:

http://web.me.com/christiandavenport/Site_81/Prototype_of_Interactive_Video-Data_Interface.html

What can you do?

- Make comments
- Make suggestions for funding current research ideas
- Make suggestions for funding other research ideas and/or collaborations
- Get access to project materials and begin analyzing
- Offer to assist in
  - Identifying existing data
  - Collecting other data
  - Seeking funds for joint projects

Let the Consortium begin!
APPENDIX

Northern Ireland Research Initiative
Coding Protocol v 2.0 12/03/09

A. Victim Number

B. Victim's Last Name

C. Victim's First Name

D. Event Number

E. Related Events

F. Data Source

G. Page Number [For ALJ Statements this should be File Name]

H. Type of Event

   0- Unknown
   1- Other (coding to be used sparingly; email Cyanne if you think you have an example)
   2- Accident

Harassment

3- Verbal Harassment/Written Harassment/Death Threat
(Perpetrator may be a civilian, a soldier, or a policeman)

4- Warning (more benign)

Individual and Group Violence

5- Indiscriminate violence/Terrorism/Massacre: Organized violence carried out intentionally and without regard for the individual identities of those killed. Generally involves the violation of multiple individuals simultaneously.

6- Targeted Attacks/Killings—Political or Military Target: Organized violence directed at an individual because of actions they took related to their political or organizational affiliations. The violated individual was unable or unlikely to retaliate. (Includes assassinations)
7- **Targeted Attacks/Killings—Sectarian Target**: Organized violence directed at an individual because of actions they took related to their sect. The violated individual was unable or unlikely to retaliate. (Includes assassinations)

8- **Brawl/Clash**: Two groups at protests; tumultuous back and forth (less than a battle); brawls happen in places like lunchrooms, bars, etc.

9- **Battle**: Two *organized bodies* engaging in armed combat (e.g., a group vs. the RUC; a group vs. the B-Specials)

10- **Shootout**: Violence between two *disorganized* bodies, or between one *organized* body and one *disorganized* body

11- **Riot/Mob violence/Looting**

*Marches, Protest and Political Events*

12- **Debate/verbal argument/Non-violent confrontation** (more of a back and forth between parties)

13- **Political March** (usually focused on civil rights issues)

14- **Sectarian March** (focused primarily on the Catholic/Protestant divide)

15- **Vigil**

16- **Speech**

17- **Strike/Picket** (specifically about labor issues)

18- **Public gathering/Meeting**

19- **Ceremony/Symbolic display by Unionists/Loyalist** (e.g., wearing apparel of the Scottish soccer team or having a bonfire on certain days)

20- **Ceremony/Symbolic display by perpetrator Republicans/Nationalists** (e.g., having a bonfire on certain days or raising the Union Jack in inappropriate places)

21- **Funeral Procession** (usually more of a preceding event)

22- **Information distribution**: tabling, press conference, graffiti

23- **Hunger strike**

24- **Protest/Civil Disobedience/Barricades** (organized; e.g., sit-ins, smaller gatherings)

25- **Protest Ban** (political ban)

26- **Counter-protest** (usually more of a preceding event; acts in a sequential manner: “This group is protesting—so will we!”)

27- **Complaint filing/Seeking legal advice**

28- **Policy Change/Announcement of Policy Change in Stormont**

29- **Policy Change/Announcement of Policy Change in Westminster**

30- **Local Level Policy Change**: at the neighborhood, city level, etc.

31- **End of Ceasefire** (usually more of a preceding event)

32- **Ceasefire/Peace talks/negotiations/international negotiations** (usually more of a preceding event)
33- Release of hostages/prisoners (usually more of a preceding event)
34- Elections (usually more of a preceding event)

Policing

35- Selective Detention/Attempted Detention: couple of guys, specifically grabbed, not charged with crimes
36- Selective Arrest/Attempted Arrest
37- Non-Selective Arrest/Non-Selective Attempted Arrest
38- Detention/Attempted Detention
39- Mass Detention (indiscriminate in nature)
40- Mass Arrest (indiscriminate in nature)
41- Asked to inform/Police co-optation
42- Collusion with the State/Suspected collusion with the State (legitimate forces cooperating with illegitimate forces (specifically cooperation with British forces; email Cyanne if you have a question)
43- Police (or Army) Road Block/Checkpoint/Patrol [a patrol is not defined as harassment]
44- Police Search (very peaceful)
45- Police curfew (usually more of a preceding event)
46- Chase/Police Chase
47- State Surveillance (more covert; not a big type of event; could include police, army or government surveillance)
48- Police Abuse during detention/arrest
49- Protest Policing/Riot policing—No Live Rounds (the policing in question must be within the bounds of legal protest/riot police work, even if distasteful)
50- Protest Policing—Live Rounds (e.g., Bloody Sunday)
51- Other forms of state repression (coding to be used sparingly; email Cyanne if you think you have an example)

Paramilitary violence

52- Intra-communal violence/social control: Paramilitary groups imposing sanctions on their own communities for behavior deemed anti-social. The difference between internal policing and social control is that internal policing has to do with the politics internal to an organization, while social control has to do with sanctioning an individual for allegedly violating social norms
53- Turf war/Territorial dispute (coding to be used sparingly; email Cyanne if you think you have an example)
54- Gang violence (coding to be used sparingly; email Cyanne if you think you have an example)
55- Ethnic derogation/Ethnic violence (coding to be used sparingly; email Cyanne if you think you have an example)
56- Intra-organizational violence/internal policing

Other Forms of Violence

57- Torture, mental or physical (coding according to UN definition of torture; email Cyanne if you have a question)
58- Beating/Kneecapping (seen as 1 guy being attacked by multiple assailants; either civilian or police)
59- Suicide/Attempted Suicide
60- Kidnapping
61- Rape/Sexual Assault/Sexual Harassment
62- Raid/Siege: can be carried out by police, but does not have to be (raid and siege are distinguished by differing levels of violence)
63- Robbery
64- Hijacking/Kidnapping
65- Provocation by Victim
66- Provocation by Perpetrator
67- Arms Purchased by Victim, or Victim’s Friends/Kin
68- Arms Purchase by Perpetrator, or Perpetrator’s Friends/Kin
69- Victim Taken to Hospital/Doctor (usually more of a corresponding event)
70- Public Sympathy for Victim (never a direct type of event)
71- Ethnic Migration (never a direct type of event)
72- Public Sympathy of Perpetrator (never a direct type of event)
73- Forcibly Evicted
74- Non-Violent Trauma

Other

75 – Meeting
76 – Troop Movement
77 – Trial
78 – Troop Travel
79 – Military Correspondence
80 – Arms Cache Recovered
81 – Fire
82 – Call for Police Protection
83 – Initiate Investigation
84 – Inform Superiors
85 – Surveillance
86 – Secure a Perimiter
87 – Legal Procedures
I. Severity of Victimization

0 – Unknown
1 – Victim died
2 – Victim was subjected to Torture
3 – Victim was subjected to other non-lethal Violence
4 – Victim was intimidated/threatened
5 – Victim was subjected to Arrest
6 – Victim was subjected to Kidnapping
7 – Victim was detained
8 – Victim was subjected to Property Violence
9 – Victim was harassed
10 – Other

J. Corresponding Security Situation - What is the security situation like in the location of the event, immediately before the event took place?

0 – Unknown
1 – Respect for Human Rights and the Rule of Law – The state is firmly in command, and constitutionally mandated rights remain legally protected.
2 – Republican Control
3 – Unionist Control
4 – Protest policing – Challenges made and responded to in state controlled territory.
5 – Police curfew/state of emergency/siege - Challenges precipitated by an increased security presence in state controlled territory. Constitutional human rights protections limited to some degree
6 – Mob violence/Riot
7 – Contested territory

K. Weapon Used (Identify all that apply)

0 – None/Unknown
1 – Fists/Feet
2 – Knives/Blunt Instruments
3 – Rubber bullets/ Tasers /Plastic Bullets
4 – Guns
5 – Bombs/Explosives
6 – Other
7- Projectiles/Rocks

L. Time of Event

0 - Unknown
1 - 24 Hour of Event if Given
25 – “morning”
26 – “mid-day”
27 – “afternoon/evening”
28 - “night”

M. Day of Event

N. Month of Event

O. Year of Event

P. Duration of Event (Count Variable)- Measured in days

Q. Event Street

R. Event Neighborhood

S. Location of Event- Categorical

0 – Unknown
1 – Street/Park or other Public Space
2 – Pub or other commercial establishment
3 – Private Residence
4 – Church/Other area of Religious significance
5 – Loyalist community space, such as community organization or school
6 – Nationalist community space, such as community organization or school
7 – Area associated with the military/police
8 – Area associated with republican militants
9 – Area associated with unionist militants
10- Government Agency or Infrastructure
11 – Other

T. Location of Event- Visibility

0 – Unknown
1 – Event took place in a highly visible location
2 – Event took place away from public visibility
**U. Location of Event - City**

0 – Location Unknown
1 – Ballycastle
2 – Cushendall
3 – Ballymena
4 – Larne
5 – Atrim
6 – Carrickfergus
7 – Bangor
8 – Nortnards
9 – Holywood
10 – Belfast
11 – West Belfast
12 – North Belfast
13 – East Belfast
14 – South Belfast
15 – Lurgan
16 – Lisburn
17 – Comber
18 – Strangford Lough
19 – Dromore
20 – Ballynahinch
21 – Downpatrick
22 – Banbridge
23 – Newry
24 – Newcastle
25 – Kilkeel
26 – Carlingford
27 – Warrenpoint
28 – Dundalk
29 – Crossmaglen
30 – Newtownhamilton
31 – Bessbrook
32 – Darkley
33 – Keady
34 – Armagh
35 – West Armagh
36 – North Armagh
37 – East Armagh
38 – South Armagh
39 – Portadown
40 – Craigavon
41 – Castleblanney
42 – Monaghan
43 – Clones
44 – Newtownbutler
45 – Upper Lough Erne
46 – Fermanagh
47 – Enniskillen
48 – Lower Lough Erne
49 – Bundoran
50 – Dungannon
51 – Coalisland
52 – Cookstown
53 – Omagh
54 – Castlederg
55 – Strabane
56 – Donegal
57 – Ballyshannon
58 – Lifford
59 – LittleKenny
60 – Buncrana
61 – Lough Foyle
62 – Portrush
63 – Coleraine
64 – Derry
65 – West Derry
66 – North Derry
67 – East Derry
68 – South Derry
69 – Limavady
70 – Dungiven
71 – Maghera
72 – Magherafelt
73 – London
74 – Other

AB. Location of Event- County

0 – Unknown
1 – Antrim
2 – Belfast
3 – Armagh
4 – Tyrone
5 – Down
6 – Fermanagh
7 – Belfast
8 – Derry
9 – Other

AC. Location of Event- Province/Country
0 – Unknown
1 - Northern Ireland
2 – Republic of Ireland
3 – England
4 – Other

AD. Reciprocity Links to Other Events- List all events connected via ties of revenge, or reciprocity, or where otherwise linked sequentially (separate by commas)

AE. Links to Other Victims- List all other victims that shared ties of acquaintance, friendship, or kinship with the victim (separate by commas)

AF. Perpetrator Ties- List all victims that were victimized by the same perpetrator (separate by commas)

AG. All Lost Lives Ties (leave blank for other coding sources)

AI. Victim's Age (count variable)

AJ. Victim's Sex

0 – Male
1 - Female

AK. Victim's Occupation

0 – Unknown
1 – Police Officer
2 – Army Officer
3 – “Blue Collar”/Manufacturing Private Sector
4 – “White Collar”/Management Private Sector
5 – Service worker Private Sector
6 – Bureaucrat
7 – None (unemployed)
8 - Student
9- Service worker Public Sector
10 - Other

AL. Victim's Residence- Street

AM. Victim's Residence- Neighborhood

AN. Victim's Organizational Affiliation

0 – no organization known
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Victims Sectarian Affiliation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-</td>
<td>None/Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-</td>
<td>Catholic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-</td>
<td>Protestant</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**AQ.**  
**Victim’s Unit**

**AT Perpetrator’s Organizational Affiliation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>no organization known</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-</td>
<td>IRA/Affiliated Groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-</td>
<td>PIRA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-</td>
<td>Other Republican Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-</td>
<td>UVF/Affiliated Groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-</td>
<td>UDA/ Tartan Gangs/Affiliated Groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-</td>
<td>Other Loyalist Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-</td>
<td>RUC/RUCR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-</td>
<td>UDR/RIR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-</td>
<td>British Government/Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-</td>
<td>Republic of Ireland Government/Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-</td>
<td>Nationalist Political Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-</td>
<td>Loyalist Political Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-</td>
<td>Other Political Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13-</td>
<td>International Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14-</td>
<td>Protestant Church</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-</td>
<td>Catholic Church</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-</td>
<td>Criminal organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17-</td>
<td>B- Specials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19-</td>
<td>Saor Eire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-</td>
<td>Garda Siochana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-</td>
<td>Blanket Men/Hunger Strike/ Dirty Protester</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22-</td>
<td>Retired (1-21)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
10 – Republic of Ireland Government/Army
11 – Nationalist Political Party
12 – Unionist Political Party
13 – Other Political Party
14 - International Organization
15 – Protestant Church
16 – Catholic Church
17 – Criminal organization
18 – B-Specials
19- Saor Eire
20- Garda Siochana
21- Other
23 - Retired (1-20)

AU.  Intensity of Perpetrator(s)’s Organization Affiliation

0 – Unknown
1 – Little Contact / Acquaintance with Members
2 – Supporter – Willing to provide organization with information or resources
3 – Militant – Willing to take up arms for the organization
4 – Militant Leadership – In a position of leadership within the organization
5 - Other

AY.  Victimized Selectively

0- Unknown/Severely Contested
1- **Organizationally Selective**- Individual was victimized selectively based on their suspected organizational affiliations, or for suspicions of collaboration with another organization
2- **Behaviorally Selective**- Individual was victimized selectively based on disruptive and antagonistic displays of behavior (frequently includes displays of ethnic custom or political preference, but also includes violent actions not connected to any organization)
3- **Individual was victimized indiscriminately**- Without regards to any *individual characteristics*, behavior or organizational affiliation of the victim. Note that this can include violence that was directed at an individual because of a group characteristic (e.g. Catholics, or Protestants) that he/she shared.
4- Individual was the victim of an accident, unintentional violence or suicide

AZ. Victimized Intentionally

0 – Unknown
1 – Individual was victimized intentionally.
3 – Individual was victimized unintentionally
4 – Individual was injured as part of an accident.
5 – Individual committed suicide for political reasons.

BA. Selective Violence Information Source- If victim was selectively violated, where did the perpetrator(s) obtain information about the victim’s actions

0- Unknown/Indiscriminate violence
1- Civilian informant
2- Militant informant
3- Wiretap/Other Surveillance
4- Neighborhood hearsay/public knowledge
5- Actions observed directly by perpetrator(s)
6- Prison Networks
7- Entrapment
8- Other

BB. Information Accuracy- If victim was selectively violated, was the information used by the perpetrator accurate?

0- Unknown/Indiscriminate violence
1- Accurate
2- Partially Accurate/Disputed
3- Inaccurate

BC. Collateral Damage

0- No known non-combatant casualties
1- Non-combatants were not intentionally targeted, but at least one was killed
2- Non-combatants were intentionally targeted and at least one was killed

BD. Justification for Violence- Perpetrator

0 – No reported justification
1 – Individual was violated in an act of revenge
2- Individual was violated to inspire acts of revenge
2 – Individual was violated to preserve law and order
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BE.</th>
<th>Justification for Violence- Victim</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>No reported justification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Individual was violated in an act of revenge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Individual was violated to inspire acts of revenge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Individual was violated to preserve law and order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Individual was violated to achieve Irish independence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Individual was violated to preserve the status of Northern Ireland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Individual was violated for sectarian reasons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Individual was violated in Self defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Individual was violated to defend or secure territory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Individual was violated during an Accident</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Individual was killed for “anti-social behavior” or other intra-communal reasons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Other justifications</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BF.</th>
<th>Public Explanation for Violence- Perpetrator</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>No reported public explanation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Perpetrator(s) released a statement explaining the action to the public</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BG.</th>
<th>Public Explanation for Violence- Victim</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>No reported public explanation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Victim released a statement explaining the action to the public</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<p>| BI. | Perpetrator’s Last Name |
| BJ. | Perpetrator’s First Name(s) |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BK</td>
<td>Perpetrator’s LL Victim Number (for Lost Lives Coding Only)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BN</td>
<td>Was there a trial or an inquest following the event? (in relation to the event in question i.e. the shooting or political death)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BO</td>
<td>Trial or Inquest Verdict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BP</td>
<td>Presence of Individual’s affiliated with the Victim’s Organization- Were others from the victim’s organization present at the time of the event?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BQ</td>
<td>Presence of Kin- Were members of the victim’s family present at the time of the event? [Kin includes spouse]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BR</td>
<td>Internal Validity- Within the statement/document/coding source itself</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BS</td>
<td>External Validity- Was the narrative of events ever contested by another data source?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BT</td>
<td>Number of Participants in Event (count variable)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BU</td>
<td>Number of Perpetrators of Event (count variable)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BV</td>
<td>Number of Victims Injured (count variable)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
BW.  Number of Victims Killed (count variable)
BX.  Additional Notes/Coder Information
BY.  Witness Name [Currently used only for ALJ Statements]
BZ.  Statement Date [Currently used only for ALJ Statements]
CA.  Attribute Unclear
CB.  Explanation for BY
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data Source Description</th>
<th>Coded Status</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Types of Events</th>
<th>Time Period</th>
<th>Number of Events</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ardoyne Commemoration Project</td>
<td>Lost Lives</td>
<td>Coding in Progress</td>
<td>Description of Ardoyne over the whole course of “the Troubles”</td>
<td>Political Deaths</td>
<td>1969-1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RUC Records (from PRONI)</td>
<td>Collected</td>
<td>Police Records events</td>
<td>Number of Protests, Public Arrests, Number of Violent Events, Number of Bombings, House Riots</td>
<td>1970-1971</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALJ Statements</td>
<td>Coding in Progress</td>
<td>Personal statements of abuses</td>
<td>Arrests for Shankill, Falls Road, and Roadblock Ardoyne</td>
<td>1970s-1980s</td>
<td>Approximately 3,000 statements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Situation Reports (British National Archives)</td>
<td>Collected</td>
<td>Army Activities, Intelligence Estimates, Location of troop deployment</td>
<td>1970s-1980s</td>
<td>Approximately 2000 situation reports Approximately 300 informant reports</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIRI Film</td>
<td>Pilot</td>
<td>Family accounts of deaths and violations</td>
<td>Location of Deaths, Troop Arrests, Deployment Policy</td>
<td>1969-?</td>
<td>58 individual interviews and family interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Death Totals from Fr. Brady</td>
<td>Collected</td>
<td>Death and Arrest Lists by Parish</td>
<td>Death totals and Arrest Totals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sr. Sarah Archival material</td>
<td>Collected</td>
<td>Statements and reports on political prisoners held in England</td>
<td>Prison abuse and arrest statements</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ardoyne Commemoration Project</td>
<td>Coded</td>
<td>Death details for people killed in</td>
<td>Political Deaths</td>
<td>1969-1998</td>
<td>99 deaths</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>